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The Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of-the Interior, is reviewing explosion
protection methods for use in gassy coal mines.
	 This performance criteria
guideline is an evaluation of three explosion protection methods of machines
electrically powered with voltages up to 15,000 volts ac.	 A sufficient amount of
basic research has been accomplished to verify that the explosion-proof and
pressurized enclosure methods can-provide adequate explosion protection with the
present state of the art up to 15,000 volts ac. 	 Theroutine application of the
potted enclosure as a stand-alone protection method requires further investigation
or development in order to clarify performance criteria and verification-cert•i-
ft-cation requirements.
	
An entensive literature search, a series of high-voltage
tests, and a design evaluation of the three explosion protection methods performed
at the White Sands Test Facility indicate that the explosion--proof, pressurized,
and potted enclosures can all be used to enclose up to 15,000 volts ac, if the
performance criteria and verification-certification requirements recommended in
this guideline are implemented.
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FOREWORD
This report was prepared b1i the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Johnson Space Center, White Sands Test Facility under USBM
Contract number J0318081. Investigations were performed by Larry Joe Linley
and Alton B. Luper with assistance from James H. Dunn. The contract was
initiated under the Minerals, Health, and Safety Technology Program. It was
administered under the technical direction of the Pittsburgh Research Center
with Lawrence W. Scott acting as the Technical Project Officer. Joseph A.
Gilchrist was the contract administrator for the Bureau of Mines. This report
is a summary of the work recently completed as a part of this contract during
the period 15 August 1981 to 15 November 1982. This report was submitted by
the authors on 15 December 1982.
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6AB STRAC T
The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines is reviewing explosion
protection methods for use in gassy coal mines, This performance criteria
guideline is an evaluation of three explosion protection methods of machines
electrically powered with voltages up to 15 000 volts AC. A sufficient amount
of basic research has been accomplished to verify that the explosion-proof and
pressurized enclosure methods can provide adequate explosion protection with
the present state of the art up to 15 000 volts AC. The routine application
of the potted enclosure as a stand alone protection method requires further
investigation or development in order to clarify performance criteria,
verification, and certification re quirements. An extensive literature search,
a series of high voltage tests, and a design evaluation of the three explosion
protection methods performed at White Sands Test Facility indicates that the
explosion-proof, pressurized, and potted enclosures can all be used to enclose
up to 15 000 volts AC, if the performance criteria, verification, and
certification requirements recommended in this guideline are implemented.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
The development of more efficient coal removal equipment for use ire
underground coal mines has resulted in a demand for more electrical power at
the working face. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, however, the
most cost effective method appears to be the increase of the supply vo ltage.
The Bureau of Mines is presently reviewing the effects of increasing the'
high voltage limit to 15 000 volts AC. One of the aspects of this review is
the effect of the new voltage limit on explosion protection techni ques. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Johnson Space Cente l-, White
Sands Test Facility has conducted an in depth review of three explosion
protection techniques (explosion-proof, pressurized, and potted techniques)
which is presented in this performance criteria guideline. The three
explosion protection methods are based on an understanding of explosion
protection theory, mine environment flammability characteristics, and the
pertinent characteristics of high voltage systems.
Back gro and
The theories behind explosion protection methods range from completely
isolating an ignition source from the mine atmosphere to confining ignitions
of the atmosphere to relatively small volumes. The application of each
explosion protection method is also dependenton the flammability
characteristics of the environment. Included in the mine environment are such
materials as methane gas, coal dust, electrical insulators, and various
materials used in the fabrication of machine enclosures. A number of
environmental and material effects, which become more important as the voltage
is increased, must also be considered. A corona discharge becomes more
intense and the potential for a high voltage arc is increased as the supply
voltage approaches 15 000 volts AC.
Performance Criteria for Ex p losion Protection Methods
The three explosion protection methods investigated have performance
criteria which are dependent upon the theory of operation and potential
failure modes of the machine and enclosure. The certi f ication and
verification procedures recommended will ensure that the design satisfies the
performance criteria before it is,placed in service and throughout the service
life of the device.
Explosion-Proof Method
The explosion-proof method is a passive form of explosion protection,
which is based on the containment of methane and coal dust deflagrations and
electric arcs. This enclosure must isolate the ignition source by containing
any flame generated within the enclosure, limiting the surface temperature to
less than 4233K ( ,150DC), and containing all electrical arcs. The
explosion-proof enclosure must also contain any pressure generated within the
enclosure which can not be vented through the flange gap. The potential
failure modes include flame propagating to the exterior of the enclosure,
surface overheating, and grounding circuit failure.
There are a number of verification and certification procedures
recommended for the explosion-proof enclosure. The verifIcat-Ion procedures
include a visual inspection of the enclosure, measurement of the flange gap,
and verification of the grounding circuit, high voltage conductor isolation,'
and any current limiting or safety devices. The tests described in Sections
18.60 through 18.62 of the Code of Federal Regulations Title 30, are
sufficient to certify that an enclosure will contain a methane flare, however,
high voltage machines must also be certified incapable of generating high
energy arcs.
Pressurized Method
The pressurized method is an active form of explosion protection based
on the isolation of the ignition source from the atmosphere in the mine. The
enclosure integrity, ignition source isolation, and the purge supply
requirements are critical performance criteria for the pressurized enclosure.
The potential failure modes for this explosion protection method include flame
propagating from the enclosure, loss of purge pressure, and the enclosure
surface becoming an ignition source. The verification procedures, for this
enclosure type involve testing the flange gap (if so equipped), the ground
circuit integrity, and the isolation of the high voltage conductors as
required for the explosion proof enclosure. The purge gasj'and gas supply
system must also be verified. Certification tests involve' an inspection of
components, (per Sections 18.60 and 18.61 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Title 30 except Section 18.61(bl)), tests of the effectiveness of the initial
purge cycle, enclosure deflection, enclosure pressure indicator performance,
spark/flame containment, and the functionality of safety switches specified
for the enclosure.
Potted Method
The potted method is a passive form of explosion protection which
isolates the electrical ignition source from the atmosphere in the mine with a
solid barrier. The mining industry is not currently using potted enclosures
as an independent explosion protection method at any voltage rating. Most of
the performance criteria sited were established by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration for use in,the outer space environment. These
performance criteria involve material selection, the protective enclosure, and
machine power dissipation. The evaluation of potential failure modes of this
protection method involves the consideration of the failure modes of the
potting compound, the enclosure integrity, and machine failures which generate
heat or arcs. Adequate verification and certification procedures are not
fully defined, at the present time, for the potted enclosure in a coal mining
application.
Hiah Voltage Ex plosion Protection Method Comoarison
The effects of supply voltage on adequate conductor isolation, insulator
selection, and power dissipation must he considered in comparing explosion
protection methods. Potted protection presents more unanswered questions in
the area of conductor isolation than either of the other two protection
9methods. The theory of operation for the potted method implies inherent
isolation, while practical application re quires definition of verification and
certification procedures, potting compound specifications, and a protective
enclosure specification. The explosion-proof and pressurized protection
methods provide isolation by separation of conductors and insulation. It has
been demonstrated that separation is not a reliable isolation technique for
high voltage uninsulated conductors during meth,)ne combustion, which can occur
in explosion-proof enclosures. Conductor separ'ation is a viable isolation
technique for the pressurized protection method due to the inherent lack of
methane and other combustible materials. The harsh operating conditions and
the high voltage environment make insulator selection most critical in the
explosion-proof protection method . Insulators selected for use in
pressurized and potted enclosures must survive the effects of the high voltage
environment, and are not normally sub,4(;,.cted to such harsh operating conditions
as methane combustion. The potted enclosure is very sensitive to the power
dissipation of the enclosed machine due to the natural thermal insulation of
the potting compound. The pressurized and explosion-proof enclosures are
relatively insensitive to the power dissipation of the machine due to forced
air circulation and convection cooling.
Conclusion
The performance criteria recommended in this guideline are sufficient to
provide adequate explosion protection with any of the three methods
evaluated. The practical implementation of the criteria, verification erld
certification requirements may be difficult in some cases. The implementation
of the potted Pot-j osure presents the most difficult obstacles to overcome for
high voltage applicatons. The explosion-proof enclosure can be utilized in
high voltage applications if due consideration is given the selection of
insulation materials. The pressurized enclosure can be directly applied to
high voltage machines using the present state-of-the-art.
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INTRODUCTION
The mining industry is developing more efficient coal removal techniques
as the demand for coal increases. To this end the industry is using
progressively larger and more powerful machines at the work'
	
face, which
require more electrical power to be delivered {ref. 45 p.2-3 ^. The past
practice ,has been to increase the supply voltage and current to obtain the
required power; however, the voltage which may be contained within a
permissible enclosure is limited to 4 160 volts AC by Title 30 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Section 18 .47(d) . An alternative to increasing the
voltage is to increase the current. However, an increase in current requires
a corresponding increase in the cable size to maintain the cable voltage
losses at an acceptable level, which limits the maximum power available at the
face ( ref. 45 p.1-1). This limiting effect on the maximum power available
makes it necessary to investigate the merits of explosion protection
techniques for electrical mine equipment, energized with up to 15 000 volts AC.
A technical investigation of the merits of utilizing several explosion
protection techniques with applications up to 15 000 volts AC was conducted by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Johnson Space Center, White
Sands Test Facility (NASA/WSTF), for the Department of the Interior Bureau of
Mines. The investigation was initiated with an extensive literature search
and review to determine the history and present state-of-the-art of explosion
protection techniques. A design evaluation of three explosion protection
methods at 15 000 volts AC was also conducted. An investigation of the
critical effects of corona discharges and arcing faults on methane air
mixtures was performed to provide data unavailable in the literature. The
data compiled from the literature search, design evaluation, and the
discharge/fault investigations is presented in the form of a design guideline.
The design guideline consists of explosion protection considerations and
design philosophy; performance, verification, and certification requirements
for each explosion protection method; and a comparison of the three explosion
protection methods with respect to high voltage considerations. The design
philosophy, performance criteria, and recommended verif,'c,Ition and
certification requirements provide a basis for selectin`^ a method and
designing an enclosure for use at up to 15 000 volts AC. The performance
criteria discussion for each method establishes the minimum requirements for a
successful enclosure method. Various concepts are recommended to verify and
certify each enclosure for use up to 15 000 volts AC. Material and design
considerations are also included to increase designer awareness of critical
safety factors.
I 
DEFINITIONS
Ignition Source - Any material, action, or process which can generate
sufficient energy to ignite a combustible mine atmosphere containing a
flammable gas and/or coal dust, and air (ref. 12 p.25).
Minimum Ignition Energy MIE) - The minimum electric spark energy required to
ignite a combustible gas or dust mixture (ref. 12 p.35). The actual
ignition energy varies with the concentration of the constituents,
pressure of the mixture, and configuration of the spark electrodes (ref.
66 pp.326-335).
Upper Flammability Limit - The maximum concentration of a gas or vapor, in air
above w is the propagation of flame does not occur on contact with an
ignition source (ref. 12 p.13).
Lower Flammability Limit- The minimum concentration of a gas or vapor in air
below  w ich the propagation of flame does not occur on contact with an
ignition source (ref. 12 p.10) .
Minimum Explosive Concentration - The minimum concentration of organic dust
which, when ignit—eT,—MIT develop 14 000 to 21 000 pascals (ref. 12
p.137) .
Autoi nition temperature - The temperature at which vapors ignite spontaneously
from the heat o • the environment (ref. 12 p.25).
Deflagration - A propagating reaction in which energy transfer from the
reacting zone to the unreacted zone is by ordinary heat and mass
transport processes (ref. 49). The resulting flame travels slower than
the local speed of sound (ref. 92). The overpressure is developed from
the heating due to the chemical reaction (ref. 12 pp.47-49).
Detonation - A reaction in which the energy is transferred from the reacting
zone to the unreacted zone on a reaction generated shock wave. This
type of reaction always propagates faster than the local speed of sound
(ref. 49 pp.4-6) (ref. 17 and ref. 66 pp.512-517) (ref. 65 and 77).
Enclosure Failure - An enclosure is considered to have failed when it allows
the potentially combustible mine atmosphere to be exposed to an ignition
source normally contained by the enclosure (ref. 74 p.16).
Machine - Any electrically powered equipment considered as a potential 	 !>
ignition source in a mine atmosphere is referred to as a machine.
Maximum Experimental Safe Gap (MESG) - The maximum gap of a joint of 25 mm
	 R
width which prevents any transmission of flame from the combustion of a 	 01
given yas (ref. 25 p. 5).
{
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BACKGROUND
Implementation of explosion protection methods for use in coal mines
requires a consideration of explosion protection theory, flammability
characteristics of the mine environment, and characteristics of high voltage
systems. Several explosion protection methods have been derived from these
basic facts.
Explosion Protection Theory
The primary function of an explosion protection method is to prevent
ignition of the atmosphere in a mine caused by machine operation or failure.
This may be accomplished by isolation of ignition sources from the combustible
atmosphere in the mine.
Ignition Sources
The ideal way to prevent the combustion of coal mine atmospheres is to
isolate all potential ignition sources from the combustible atmosphere. This
can be accomplished by either placing a barrier between,the ignition source
and the mine atmosphere or physically removing the ignition source from the
mine. Tine physical barrier between the ignition source and the combustible
atmosphere must be such that the two have no opportunity to interact. The
barrier could be constructed of a solid, liquid, or gas, which must be inert
to the ignition source as well as the mine environment. A small portion of
the mine atmosphere around the ignition source maybe allowed to burn if the
combustion is confined to a volume of gas around the ignition source. The
method of confining the combustion might be passive (enclose the ignition
source in a box) or active (an automatic fire extinguishment system).
Physical removal of electrical ignition sources would appear to require that a
nonelectrical power source be used in the gassy areas of the mine. Hydraulics
and compressed air are examples of the use of nonelectrical power sources.
Both isolation and physical removal of the ignition source are applicable in
certain situations involving known ignition sources.
Combustible Atmosphere
The actual removal of the methane contaminant from the mine atmosphere
is not practical due to its inherent nature in coal. Mine ventilation is a
method used to dilute the combustible atmosphere below the lower flammability
limit. Regulations govern the amount, velocity, and quality of the air which
is delivered to the face and specifies what actions must be taken when the
methane concentration increases above a given level (ref. 89 Section 75).
Flammable concentrations of methane are assumed to be in certain areas of the
mine, and the law requires that appropriate measures be taken (ref. 89 Section
75.500).
Flammability Characteristics
The coal mine environment necessarily contains many 'flammable
materials. The selection of an explosion protection method is dependent on
the flammability characteristics of methane, coal dust, electrical insulation
and other enclosure materials. The flammability characteristics of all the
material: used in the construction of an explosion protection device mist be
evaluated.
I
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Methane
Methane may be distributed throughout the coal seam or concentrated in
areas of high porosity coal which rapidly vent into the mine when ruptured
during the coal removal process. Mine ventilation is required to'jdilute -the
methane to less than 1.0 percent by volume (ref. 89 Section 75.308). However,
in the event of rapid methane release or a ventilation failure, it is possible
for the methane concentration to increase to within the flammability limits of
5.0 to 15.4 percent by volume in air (ref. 12 p.1$ and ref. 16 p.441) .
Methane ignition sources are grouped into three general categories: electric
sparks, open flame, and autoignition temperature (810 0K or 5370C) (ref. 12
p.27 and ref. 16 p.441) . The minimum spark ignition energy of these
concentrations of methane range from 0.3 to 10 mi 11 i joules (ref. 66 p .333) .
k	 An open flame will normally have sufficient energy to ignite flammable
concentrations of methane.
Coal Dust
Coal dust is constantly generated during the mining process. The
minimum ignition energy of coal dust is dependent on the concentration in air
and the particle size. The smaller more easily suspended particles require
the least amount of energy to be ignited for a given concentration of coal
dust in air (ref. 12 p.139). The minimum spark ignition energy of coal dust
is from 20 to 60 millijoules and the minimum explosive concentration is from
40 to 60 milligrams of coal dust per liter of  air (ref. 35 pp.21-22) . The
ignition temperature of layered coal dust can be as low as 428D  (155DC)
for deep (.10 to .20 m) layers of dust (ref. 12 p.143).
Electrical Insulation
The selection of an electrical insulating material in an explosion
protection device is dependent on the flammability and the potential
decomposition products of the material when exposed to the mine machine
operating environment. Many organic insulating materials generate combustible
products during decomposition as reported by Morley and Trutt (ref. 75
pp.35-39) and by Kratzer, Lee, Nakahara, and Paciorek (ref. 64 pp.127-133) .
Decomposition is accelerated and product distribution varies when the material
is heated or burned. These decomposition products can have flammability
characteristics which could exceed the capabilities of a protective enclosure
designed for methane and coal dust combustion. For example, an
explosion-proof enclosure designed to contain methane combustion will not
contain hydrogen combustion due to the difference in MESG (ref. 75 p.11).
Enclosure Materials
The relative flammability of metals can be based on consideration of
ease of ignition, combustion rate, character of combustion products, effect of
combustion on other enclosure materials, and the character of any probable
failure as recommended by McKinley (ref. 71 p.2) . Explosion protection
devices in the United States are generally constructed of metal with no stated
specifications as to the composition of the metal. However, certain metals
used in the construction of explosion protection devices can be ignited if
exposed to high energy Electric arcs (ref. 51 pp. B20, B35, and ref. 71
pp.26-29) .
Pl astics or cFrami cs may be co nsidered, for use as enclos
materials in some cases (ref. 24 Section 6 and ref. 25 Section 11.6).
Ceramics are considered a noncombustible material. However, most plastics
must be grouped with the organic insulators and have similar flammability
characteristics.
General High Voltage System Characteristics
The characteristics of high voltage systems must be considered in the
design of explosion protection devices for the mining envirnoment. The two
characteristics of interest are corona and arc discharge since the probability
of the occurance and effects of both is increased with supply voltage.
Corona Discharge
Corona discharge is defined as an electrical discharge of less than 0.1
ampere (ref . 33 p .207) . It is caused by the ionization of gases under the
influence  of an electrical field (ref. 33 p.2'52).  The intensity of a corona
discharge depends on the voltage, 'size of the conductor, frequency of the
voltage, conductor surface conditions (ref. 30 p.29), and atmospheric pressure
and temperature (ref. 33 pp.25:6, 277, and 28U).
A corona discharge will result in a certain degree of ionization of the
local atmosphere and a corresponding decrease in the dielectric strength of
the atWosphere (ref. 33 p.335) . Corona has been shown to be an ignition
source 'for methane in air mixtures (ref. 38) . The dielectric strength of
insulaition material has been shown to degrade when exposed to corona discharge
(ref. 84 p.562) .
High Voltage Arcing
An arc is defined as a discharge current greater than 0.1 ampere which
is self-sustaining (ref. 33 p.20). High voltage arcs occur when the source
voltage exceeds -the breakdown voltage of the gas se parating the conductors.
The combustion of a methane and air mixture generates free ions which decrease
the dielectric strength of the resulting atmosphere (ref. 15 p.l). This
decrease in dielectric strength can lead to an unpredictable arc discharge
from exposed high voltage conductors (ref . 38) .
The effects of high voltage arcs on the peak combustion pressureof
methane has not been well described in the literature. Tests simulating low
energy corona discharge faults and high energy (up to 1 408 kilojoules) arcing
faults across a 0.15 meter (6 inch) gap in a 1.061 cubic meter chamber
indicate that methane and air combustion pressures were approximately the same
when ignited by a high energy arc as when ignited by corona. The combustion
pressures of the corona tests and arc tests were repeatable within 5% given
similar initial conditions (ref. 38) . Ciok reports that tests conducted in a
.250 cubic meter chamber where energies 25 times greater than, those described
above produced combustion pressures approximately 2 times greater (ref. 32
p4.6). This indicates that the peak combustion pressure is virtually
independent of the energy which ignited the mixture, and very dependent on the
0`9'ume of the enclosure.
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR EXPLOSIO
All methods of explosion protection must prevent ignition of the mine
atmosphere, but each method has separate definable requirements in order to
meet that objective. Three explosion protection methods (explosion-proof,
pressurized, and potted) are evaluated for supply voltages up to 15 000 volts
AC. The explosion protection methods are compared by evaluation of the theory
of operation, performance criteria, failure modes, and
certification-verification procedures.
Explosion-Proof Method
The explosion-proof method is a passive form of explosion protection.
This method isolates the ignition source with an enclosure which is capable of
containing ignitions of the mine atmosphere.
Theory of Operation
The explosion-proof enclosure must contain all events occurring within
the enclosure and prevent an ignition of the atmosphere outside the
enclosure. (ref. 89 Sections 18.50 and 18.62). This passive type of
protection must be constructed to contain methane deflagration, coal dust
deflagration and electric arcs since it is assumed that any combustible
atmosphere entering the enclosure will be ignited.
Performance Criteria
An explosion-proof enclosure must isolate any ignition source from the
atmosphere in the mine, and contain the pressure generated from combustion
within the enclosure. An enclosure which meets this general performance
criteria will protect the mine atmosphere from ignition sources in
electrically powered machines contained within the enclosure.
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Isolation of Ignition Source
The enclosure must not allow flame to propagate through the flange gap,
(a specified separation between an enclosure body and a flange, the dimensions
of which produce complete quenching of a flame) a,d must not allow ignition of
the combustible atmosphere -in the mine (ref. 89 Section 18.62). Materials
used within the enclosure must not decompose into flammable by-products (ref.
89 Section 18.25). The decomposition products of many electrical insulators
have a smaller MESG than methane. This could result in a flame propagating
through the flange gap without being quenched ( ref . 75 p.11).
f
a^
16
The outside surface temperature of the explosion-proof enclosure must
not exceed 4230K ( 1500C) . This limit has been established in paragraph
18.23 of the Code )f Federal Regulations to prevent the ignition of coal
dust. Materials u;,ed within the enclosure should not continue to burn after
an ignition source is removed (ref. 12 p.18 and ref. 89 Section 18.62(b3)).
This requirement prevents excessive heat stress on the enclosure and minimizers
pressure generated during combustion.
The explosion-proof enclosure must contain all electrical arcs.
Electrical discharges must not occur on the exterior of the enclosure.
Paragraph 18.50 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that enclosures be
connected to the mine grounding system to prevent the ignition of coal dust or
methane by spark discharges. Electrical grounding and conductor isolation
become more critical as the operating voltage is increased due to the
unpredictability of the atmospheric dielectric strength during a methane
deflagration ( ref . 38) . Electrical machines and conductors energized with
voltages and currents of sufficient energy to mechanically damage enclosure
walls due to arcing ( ref. 38 and 62) should be insulated in a manner which is
independent of the atmospheric dielectric strength. The failure of many
electrically powered machines can produce an electrical arc capable of
producing 3 937 008 joules per meter (100 000 joules per linear inch) which
will melt a 0.0127 meter (1/2 inch) steel plate (ref . 68).
Pressure Containment
The explosion-proof enclosure must contain any pressure generated within
the enclosure which cannot be vented through the flange gap. The Code of
Federal Regulations re quires that an enclosure contain at least 1 034 214
pascals (150 psig). The combustion of materials used in the enclosure must
not produce pressures that exceed the overpressure caused by methane
combustion in air (ref. 89 Section 18.31 (al)).
Failure Modes and Design Considerations
Explosion-proof enclosures must meet the performance criteria in order
to provide explosion protection from electrical machines. failure modes for
explosion-proof enclosures include flame propagating to the exterior of the
enclosure, surface overheating, and ground circuit failure.
Flame Propagation
The combustion of gases other than methane, mechanical damage to the
enclosure wall-, or compromise of the MESG may allow a flame to propagate to
the exterior of the enclosure. Flames which result from the combustion of
gases such as hydrogen and acetylene can readily pass through a flange gap
designed for methane ( ref. 75 P.11). Currently, no materials are allowed
within the enclosure which decompose to produce a combustible by-product (ref
89 Section 18.25).
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An explosion-proof enclosure can be mechanically damaged by a roof fall,
metal fatigue, arc burn through, transportation and handling, etc. Visual
observation is the only means of sensing such damage. The enclosure should be
constructed with as much reinforcement as practical and installed in a
location that provides as much protection from damage as possible. The
prevention of mechanical damage in the form of fatigue failures begins with a
strong design, with wide tolerances for thermal or mechanical stresses. King
and Bollinger report independently the use of computer models to analyze
proposed explosion-proof enclosures for stresses produced during methane
deflagration (ref. 13 and 63). Arc burn through (as defined in the American
Society for Testing and Materials test E39U) is an important consideration for
high voltage enclosures. The possibility of an arc from a high voltage
conductor to the enclosure wall is not increased by the addition of methane to
the atmosphere. However, a methane deflagration has been shown to greatly
increase the probability for arcing to the enclosure wall. Tests conducted at
NASA/W STF indicate that the dielectric strength of the atmosphere between
exposed high voltage (14 400 volts AC) conductors is very unpredictable during
methane combustion. Arc gaps were shown to vary from 0.15 to 0.59 meter (6 to
23 inches) under these conditions (ref. 38). An arc within the enclosure that
causes failure of a wall would result in an enclosure failure at the worst
possible time, for it must be assumed that if a combustible mixture exists
within the enclosure, a similar mixture is outside also. Fault clearing
devices to sense the excessive current (ref. 86) or the phase change between
current and voltage (ref. 48) could be used to prevent this failure mode.
The MESG can be exceeded in several ways. Particulate left on the
flange during reassembly can increase the flange gap sufficiently to allow
methane flames to escape. Heat or mechanical damage can cause the flange to
warp or damage the flame quenching surfaces. An excessive gap may be caused
by a temperature gradient across the flange or mechanical abuse. This is
readily detectable with standard veri-ication tests. However, a damaged
quenching surface could remain undetected until the enclosure failed. Secured
flanges with access limited to authorized personnel has been recommended (ref.
28) to prevent ignition sources from being exposed to the atmosphere in the
mine by inadvertent removal of the flange while the machine is engaged.
Surface Overheating
The external surface temperatures of the enclosure are limited to
4230K (150oC) (ref. 89 Section 18.23). The design must prevent the normal
operating temperature from exceeding this limit due to the ignition
characteristics of coal dust. The insulating qualities of dusts which can be
expected to accumulate on exposed surfaces must be considered when determining
the maximum surface temperature of the enclosure (ref. 89 Section 75.800 and
ref. 48) . Abnormally high temperatures can be produced by some electrical
fault conditions. Current sensing devices, to clear the,f ault, and fire
retardent materials must be used to limit the heating in the enclosure. A
temperature sensitive switch might be applicable in some cases to deactivate
the machine and/or activate an alarm when the surface temperature exceeds
4230K (150oC) .
C
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Ground Circuit Failure
The circuit connecting the enclosure to the mine grounding system
becomes more critical as the enclosure operating voltage is increased. The
electric field of the voltage supply will charge an enclosure wall grounded
through a high resistance to a voltage proportional to the capacitance between
the enclosure and ground. This can cause a spark discharge from the surface
of an explosion-proof enclosure which can ignite methane or coal dust and air
mixtures. An effective grounding circuit does not allow a charge to
accumulate on the enclosure wall with respect to ground. An arc to the
enclosure wall can also raise the enclosure to voltages near the supply
potential if the ground circuit is not sufficient in quality. A protected and
monitored ground circuit is req uired to prevent grounding failures, as
specified in sections 18.50 and 75.800 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Title 30.
Verification and Certification
Verification tests are used to insure that an explosion-proof enclosure
continues to meet the ';performance criteria in accordance with Section 75.503,
Title 30 of the Federal Code of Regulations. Certification tests demonstrate
that a new or reconditioned unit satisfies the performance criteria before
being placed in service. The verification and certification tests now being
conducted on explosion-proof enclosures are adequate for high voltage
applications with some additions.
Verification
Visual inspection, flange gap verification, and routine maintenance are
currently used to guarantee explosion-proof enclosure integrity. However, the
use of high voltage requires verifying the integrity of the grounding circuit,
high voltage conductor isolation, and any current limiting or safety devices.
Ground Circuit Integrity
The conductance of the ground circuit should be verified and recorded on
a periodic basis. Adequate grounding should be verified by a measurement of
the resistance from a defined point on the enclosure to a defined point on the
mine ground system. The same measurement points should he used for each
subsequent measurement on a given enclosure. These>`measurry`ment points must be
clean (wire brushed or polished) and dry so that they will',provide low contact
resistance each time a measurement is made. The ground wire should also be
physically checked for corrosion, fraying, crimping, and tight contacts. The
need for these verification tests has been reported by Towle (ref. 85) .
Conductor Isolation
The conductor isolation verification test is used to determine the
resistance between the high voltage conductor and the enclosure wall. This
measurement should be recorded and observed for any downward trend in
resistance over a period of time. A downward trend would indicate that the
insulating medium between the conductor and ground is degrading; thus,
eventual failure can be expected. Firm guidelines are not now available and
will be required before this verification can be effectively implemented.
Safety Devices
Any device which increases the safety of using an explosion-proof
enclosure must be routinely checked for proper operation. This should involve
a visual and functional check to determine the operational status of the
device. Part 75 of the Code of Federal Regulations Title 30 specifies the
methods and procedures for verifying the operational status of the safety
devices currently required. Verification procedures must be established for
all safety devices approved for any explosion protection method.
Certificat ion
The present certification tests, as specified in Title 30 Part 18,
Subpart C, of the Code of Federal Regulations are adequate for enclosures
powered with lower voltages. However, as the supply voltage approaches the
corona transition, as defined by Lewis and Von Elbe, specific tests are
req uired to guarantee that high energy arc failures do not occur (ref. 66
p.330).  The corona transition voltage for a specific case depends on the
orientation of the conductor relative to the ground or neutral conductor, the
size, surface condition, type and composition of the conductor, and conditions
and composition of the surrounding atmosphere.
Enclosure Integrity Tests
The certification tests described in Section 18.60 through 18.62 of the
Code of Federal Regulations Title 30 certify that the explosion-proof
enclosure will contain a methane flame. These tests consist of reviewing the
design, comparing the enclosure configuration with the drawing, and subjecting
the enclosure to methane flame tests.
High Voltage Certification Tests
It is recommended that a high voltage machine be certified to be
incapable of generating a high energy arc. Any part of a machine which can
generate a corona discharge must also be considered as a source for an arcing
fault during a methane deflagration (ref. 38) . A visual inspection of the
unit should be conducted, and discrepancies which could increase the corona
current must be eliminated (ref . 30 p29) . The explosion-proof enclosure must
be placed in a combustible atmosphere similar to that defined in Title 30 of
the Code of 'Federal Regulations, Section 18.62, and tested as follows. The
machine should be energized with the specified supply voltage in a manner
which simulates the intended use (intermittent or continuous). The methane
and air mixture should be ignited as required in the explosion test to certify
the high voltage isolation is maintained during methane combustion. The
encl,asure configuration should be considered unacceptable if an arc is struck
at any time during this test (assuming sufficient current is available for a
damaging arc) .
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Pressurized Method
The pressurized method is an active form of explosion protection. This
method requires an inert or noncombustible gas to replace combustible gas
mixtures exposed to the ignition source.
Theory of Operation
Pressurized enclosures isolate  an ignition source from a potentially
combustible atmosphere by filling the enclosure with an inert gas or fresh air
and maintaining a positive pressure within the enclosure. The positive
pressure does not allow combustible gases to enter the enclosure; thus, the
enclosure must be rated to contain only the purge pressure.
Performance Criteria
The enclosure integrity, ignition source isolation, and the purge supply
requirements are critical in providing an effective pressurized enclosure.
Enclosures which meet this performance criteria will isolate the coal mine
atmosphere from ignition sources generated by the enclosed electrically
powered machine.
Enclosure Integrity
The pressurized enclosure must be constructed to contain the purge
pressure. The purge pressures re quired for this method are effective at
differential pressures as low as 24.9 pascals (0.1 inch of water) (ref. 3).
The enclosure design must be sufficiently rugged to withstand the handling
procedures common to the mining industry and should comply with the AS ME
Pressure Vessel Code (ref . 1) . A safety device must deactivate the machine if
enclosure pressure is too low (ref. 3 p.14 and ref. 28 pp.23-24).
Ignition Source Isolation
All ignition sources associated with the machine and the pressurized
enclosure must be isolated from the atmosphere in the mine. The pressurized
enclosure must not provide a means of producing external arcs or sparks. The
enclosure must be connected to the mine grounding system (as discussed for the
explosion-proof method) such that the enclosure will not develop a static
charge. The enclosure must be constructed to contain any sparks or flame
which might be generated within the enclosure. The application of flange
gaps, gaskets, and spark/flame arrestors is required to contain any sparks or
fl ame generated within the enclosure (ref. 39 p.96) . Combustion produces ions
which increase the conductance of the local atmosphere and the possibility of
a high voltage arc which could damage the enclosure and ignite the mine
atrmsphere (ref . 75 p.18) . Therefore, materials selected for use within an
enclosure must be f ire retardent or noncombustible (ref. 75 p.22) . Low
flammability materials must be used to minimize the external surface
temperatures during enclosure atmosphere combustion by reducing the
availability of fuel to ignition sources. The temperature of all enclosure
exterior surfaces as well as the enclosure exhaust air temperatures must not
exceed 423DK (150D C) to prevent coal dust ignition (ref. 12 p.143).
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Purge Supply
The purge supply for the pressurized method of explosion protection must
be adequately specified and monitored in order to ensure that the machine is
isolated from the combustible mine atmosphere. The design specification of
the purge gas supply should include the type of gas (compressed air, bottled
air, bottled nitrogen, etc.), the quality of the gas (allowable hydrocarbons,
water content, etc.), and the volumetric flow rate of the gas required to
maintain the minimum enclosure pressure. The purge gas supply must have
provided at least 10 enclosure volume changes before the machine is energized
(ref. 3 p.21). The purge must dilute any combustible gases generated by
material decomposition to below the lower flammability limit. The purge must
not allow accumulations of decomposition products. The allowable rate of
combustible material generation must be specified for each material used in
each application. This determination is primarily dependent on the amount of
material used in the enclosure (ref. 75) and the purge specification.
The quantity and quality of the purge supply must be continuously
monitored in order to assure that the purge specifications are met. All
pressurized enclosures must be equipped with a pressure or flow switch capatfl e
of activating an alarm and de-energizing the enclosed machine when the
internal pressure of the enclosure falls below 24.9 pascals (0.1 inch of
water) (ref. 3 p.15). A methane monitor, similar to those used on continuous
miners, must be located inside the pressurized enclosure to continuously
monitor the purge supply. The monitor must activate an alarm and de-energize
the machine if methane is detected. The alarm level should be set to N by
volume of methane, as this quantity of methane in air is well established as a
required action point (ref. 89 Section 75.307-8).
Failure Modes and Design Considerations
Pressurized enclosures which fail to meet the performance criteria will
not provide adequate explosion protection. The method fails when flame
propagates from the enclosure, purge pressure is lost, or the enclosure
surface becomes an ignition source.
Flame Propagates From the Enclosure
Enclosure materials and contaminating gases can provide sufficient fuel
for combustion in a pressurized enclosure. These materials and gases can be
ignited by mechanical or electrical failures in the machine. The enclosure
must be constructed to contain any flame or sparks generated within the
enclosure during such failures. This requires the use of seals and/or flange
gaps at access ports (ref. 3), spark/flame arrestors on the exhaust port(s)
(ref. 80), and consideration of the geometry of the enclosure-machine
combination (no potential spark sources in the plane of a flange gap or in
line with an exhaust port) (ref. 75 p.9).
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The use of flame retardent or noncombustible materials is also a
necessary practice to minimize combustion possibilities (ref. 75 p.22) . The
pressurized explosion protection method prevents gases from entering the
enclosure from the exterior; however, combustible gases can be generated from
materials within the enclosure. For example, corona discharges and resistance
heating of electrical insulators have been shown to generate flammable gases
(ref. 64 pp.127-133 and ref. 75 pp.35-39). The offgassing rate of the
enclosure materials must be such that the purge is sufficient to dilute the
resulting combustible gas mixture below the lower flammability limit of the
offgassed products.
Methane contamination of the purge supply is another potential source of
fuel.	 However, this would be detected by thZ enclosure methane monitor and
result in an alarm being activated and the machine being de-energized. The
use of an inert gas purge would eliminate combustion within the enclosure by
removing the oxygen source. This solution, however, would require that the
enclosure be vented outside the mine.
Loss of Purge Pressure
The purge pressure can become ineffective when the purge source is
interrupted or the enclosure integrity is compromised. the purge supply can
be interrupted by damage to the supply duct or by depletion of the purge gas
source. These failure modes must be detected by the enclosure pressure/flow
sensor. The supply duct must be maintained to profide the re quired quantity
of purge gas to the enclosure. The purge supply pressure should be routinely
verified and maintained.
The enclosure integrity  may be compromised through damage or improper
access. Enclosure wall damage can be the source of a leak which allows the
enclosure pressure to fall below 24.9 pascals (0.1 inch of water) . The
pressurized enclosure must be constructed to withstand the expected conditions
of use (ref. 3 p.8) and contain any sparks or flame as previously noted. Any
damage compromising the enclosure integrity must be immediately repaired. The
effectiveness of the purge is lost immediately when any access port is opened
while the machine is energized. An enclosure pressure switch or a purge flow
safety switch is an effective element in preventing the ignition of the mine
atmosphere when a purged system has been compromised. Safety switches that
are used to guarantee the purge system integrity must be configured to address
all modes of purge failure (ref. 3 p.16). An access port switch should be
installed such that the machine is de-energized as soon as possible after the
port begins to open (ref. 3 p.14). Additional security should be provided
such as the locked or secured access currently used on explosion-proof
enclosures (ref . 28 pp.23-24) .
Surface Ignition Source
The surface of a pressurized enclosure can become an ignition source
when the surface temperature exceeds 423 0K (150PC) or when a static charge
develops on the enclosure surface. A temperature switch as described for the
explosion-proof enclosure may be required in e quipment which may be overloaded
(ref. 3 p.15). A grounding circuit failure can allow an enclosure surface to
develop a static charge due to the moving purge gas. The pressurized
enclosure must have ground circuit protection and monitoring devices as
described for the explosion-proof enclosure.
Verification and Certification
Verification tests are required to guarantee that pressurized enclosures
are providing explosion protection. These tests must be designed to verify
the enclosure, purge system, and electrical system integrity. Certification
testing must be performed to assure that the design and implementation of the
pressurized enclosure performance criteria have been practically incorporated
in the construction of the unit.
Verification
The flange gap (if the enclosure is so equipped), ground circuit
integrity, and the isolation of the high voltage conductors should be verified
for pressurized enclosures in the same manner as described for the
explosion-proof enclosure. A pressure indicating device should be installed
on pressurized enclosures to provide a readily available means of monitoring
the purge supply, checking the operation of the pressure or flow safety
switch, door safety switche3, and detecting an enclosure failure (ref. 3
p.31). Flame arrestors must be routinely serviced to remove any foreign
material which may clog the openings (ref. 28 p.11). The flame arrestor must
be replaced if corrosion or other mechanical damage is observed during this
service. The purge supply may consist of bottled gas or some means of forced
air from outside the mine. The purge source must be routinely analyzed to
guarantee that the purge supply is not contaminated with flammable or other
unwanted gases. A periodic visual inspection of the purge system supply line
must be conducted for damage and leaks to minimize the potential for
contamination downstream of the source.
Certification
There are several tests of the pressurized enclosures which are required
to guarantee that the design meets the performance criteria. However, an
explosion test of the pressurized enclosure is not required (ref. 56
pp.72-73). The inspection of components of the complete machine are required
as described in Sections 18.60 and 18.61 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Title 30 (except 18.61 (bl) which requires an explosion-proof enclosure).
Additional tests must certify that the initial purge cycle, enclosure
deflection, the enclosure pressure indicator, spark/flame containment, and the
function of any safety devices specified for the enclosure are adequate to
meet the performance criteria.
The purge cycle certification procedure recommended by Hinds is
performed by purging the pressurized enclosure with pure nitrogen until the
oxygen concentration is reduced below 1%. The enclosure is then purged with
air at the specified pressure or flow rate until the oxygen concentration
approaches that of air. The time required to return the oxygen concentration
in the enclosure to that of air should be less than or equal to the purge
cycle time specified by the enclosure designer (ref. 56).
The Pressure Vessel Code specifies that a given vessel must be equipped
with a pressure relief device such that if the supply regulation fails so as
to deliver a maximum flow, a hazardous pressure cannot occur wi0in the
enclosure (ref. 1 and ref. 3 p.35). A wall deflection test is recommended in
order to certify compliance with this requirement. This test is performed by
pressurizing the enclosure to the maximum pressure capable of being developed
s{ft
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by a failure of the purge system and then measuring the resulting deflection.
Any distortion over 3.333 millimeter per linear meter (0.040 inch per linear
foot) is not acceptable (ref. 89 Section 18.62b5). The enclosure pressure
indicator may be certified in conjunction with the wall deflection test. An
acceptable indicator must display an accurate status of the enclosure pressure
above and below 24.9 pascals (0.1 inch of water differential). A test to
certify that an enclosure will prevent sparks or flame generated within the
enclosure from igniting a combustible atmosphere outside the enclosure is
required. However, there is insufficient documentation in the literature to
define the requirements for such a test (ref. 3 p.14).
The certification of the enclosure safety devices can be accomplished
using a simple series of tests. The enclosed machine is activated with the
specified purge in progress. Each access port is opened to observe that each
switch operates as designed. The enclosure pressure switch or flow switch is
certified by reducing the flow of purge gas while monitoring the enclosure
pressure. The switch must operate at 24.9 pascals (0.1,inch of water
differential pressure), thereby de-energizing the equipment and activating the
alarm. The methane monitor is certified by injecting a quantity of methane
(dependent on the purge gas flow rate) sufficient to form a 1% mixture of
methane in air within the enclosure and verify that the alarm is activated and
equipment is de-energized by the monitor. The temperature switch, if so
eq uipped, is certified by heating the local area of the switch to a
temperature slightly greater than 1500C and observing tha'. the switch is
activated at 4230K (1500C).
25
Potted Method
The potted method is a passive form of explosion protection. This
method isolates the electrical ignition source from the atmosphere in the mine
with a solid barrier. This discussion is general due to the wide variety of
potting compounds available and the small amount of researullp performed in
explosion protection related areas. The critical characteristics of potted
enclosures include long term mechanical and chemical stability of potting
compounds and the effect of various aspects of the mining environment on the
candidate compounds.
Theory of Operation
The solid material used in the potted enclosure must completely isolate
the electrical ignition source from the combustible atmosphere. The potting
compound must coat or encapsulate all electrical ignition sources in order to
provide a hermetic seal and electrical isolation. A jacket or shield is
provided to mechanically protect the potting and machine components.
Performance Criteria
Potted enclosures are not in common use as an independent explosion
protection method in the mining industry at any voltage rating (ref. 45
p.32.2.2). Most of the performance criteria sited for encapsulating high
voltage sources were originally established by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration for use in the outer space environment (ref. 30). The
following performance criteria are adapted for application to the coal mine
environment and are subject to refinement as more experience is gained in the
use of these enclosures. The performance criteria concern the general areas
of material selection, the protective enclosure, and the machine power
dissipation.
Material Selection
The stability of the potting compound selected must be sufficient to
guarantee that it will not degrade in service to the point of allowing
exposure of an electrical ignition source to the mine atmosphere. The potting
compound must be mechanically, chemically, and electrically stable over the
expected lifetime of the ^.achine it is to protect. These compounds must be
applied in such a manner that no voids are formed during the pouring or curing
process, and must have sufficient mechanical strength to withstand the
stresses induced by normal machine operation. The chemical stability of these
potting compounds must be such that the electrical and mechanical
characteristics are not compromised when exposed to the mine environment, such
as methane, coal dust, mine water, various oils and greases, and temperature
extremes. The potting compound must provide electrical isolation`"Of the
supplied power under all use conditions.	 ;}
it
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Protective Enclosure
The protective enclosure for a potted or encapsulated machine must
prevent the potting compound from being degraded by the mine environment. The
protective enclosure must prevent the potting compound from being exposed to
standing water, since most compounds absorb water to a certain extent
resulting in degradation of various critical characteristics (ref. 64 p.35).
The protective enclosure must be of sufficient strength to prevent damage to
the compound due to mechanical stress while the enclosure is being moved. The
enclosure should provide protection from abrasion and other forms of
mechanical damage, and it should be constructed of a conductive . material and
connected to the mine grounding system as described for the explosion-proof
enclosure. Section 18 . 31(b) in Title 30 of the Cod6 of Federal Regulations
specifies the thickness of materials and fange gaps to be used on the
enclosure and the means of electrical, access).
Machine Power Dissipation and Temperature
A machine to be installed in a potted enclosure should not dissipate
enough heat ' to allow the surface temperature to exceed 4230K (150o C) . The
actual power dissipation limit depends on the thermal conductivity and heat
capacity of the particular potting compound. The potting compound and
protective enclosure combination must be capable of containing a machine
failure.
Failure Modes and Design Considerations
The failure of the potted enclosure to meet the performance criteria
could result in an ignition source being exposed to the mine environment. The
potting material, the protective enclosure, or the enclosed machine could fail
in a n umber of ways.
Material Failure
The potting compound may allow the ignition source to be exposed to a
combustible atmmsphere by failing mechanically or electrically. An electrical
ignition source can be exposed through mechanical failure of the potting
material in the form of voids, stress cracks, and compressive fracture. Voids
can be formed in two wa!^ . Air may be entrapped in the potting compound
during the pouring process, or gases may evolve and become entrapped during
the curing process. 'Jo ids and cracks increase the electrical stress across
the gaF-!solid interface and lead to electrical discharges which over a period
of time degrade the cl iel ectri c strength of the potting campound. Cracks may
develop as the polymer chains are cut by either electrical discharges or the
resulting by-products (ref. 30 pp.25 and 33) as reported by Sharbough and
Devins ( ref. 36). Roof fall damage could cause a compressive fracture or
crack in the compound and expose an ignition source to the combustible
atmosphere.
i4
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Little information is available concerning the degradation of electrical
and mechanical characteristics of potting compound due to chemical
interactions with low energy discharges (corona), methane, coal dust, etc.
The reaction between methane or coal dust and a specific potting compound can
generally be predicted by standard chemical evaluation; however, the effect of
an energy source (corona, leakage current, etc.) on the chemical reaction is
very difficult to determine (ref. 30 p.25).
The effect of water exposure on potting compounds is well documented and
is the subject of a test standardized by the American Society for Testing and
Materials (Procedure Number D570 - Water Absorption). The dielectric strength
and tracking resistance decrease as water is absorbed into the potting
compound resulting in an increase in the leakage current and resistive heating
of the material. The degradation of either of these characteristics will lead
to a potentially catastrophic failure of the enclosure due to the energy
released by a high voltage arc (ref. 83). Variations in the dielectric
strength are more likely to cause arcing as the voltage increases. Some
hydrocarbons (oils, greases, etc.) found in the mining industry can attack
potting compounds resulting in loss of mechanical and dielectric strength
(ref. 73 p.109-160). The potting compound being considered should be
carefully evaluated for compatibility with any reactive components that are
found in the mine environment.
Protective Enclosure Integrity
The potting compound may expose an ignition source to the mine
atmosphere if the protective enclosure fails to provide adequate protection.
Compressive fracture, cracks or excessive exposure to water could compromise
	 a`
the potting compound to the point of electrical or mechanical failure. The
protective enclosure may become a spark ignition source if the enclosure
grounding circuit fails. The possibility of the protective enclosure coming
into direct contact with the supply potential is minimal due to the inherent
insulating qualities of the potting compounds. However, a protected ground
circuit is necessary due to the capacitance between the machine and the
enclosure wall.
Machine Failure
Machine failures generating heat or arcs can cause the potted enclosure
to become an ignition source. A machine failure which generates heat can
raise the potting compound temperature to a decomposition point (ref. 64)
(ref. 75 p.35) and/or phase change (ref . 83) . The probability of potting
compounds attaining high temperatures is increased due to the natural thermal
insulating qualities of good electrical insulators (ref. 81 p.296). Certain
compounds have been found to generate combustible gases such as hydrogen and
acetylene at elevated temperatures (ref. 75 p.35-29) . The evaluation of
current_ research indicates that these compounds should be strictly avoided
(ref. 64l
 and 75). Applications in which the power dissipation of the machine
approaches the limit allowed for the selected potting compound, may require
the installation of a temperature sensitive switch (ref. 3 p.23).  Thi s switch
would be located in an area of the enclosure
operating temperature and would activate an
as the temperature exceeded 423 0K (1500C).
is now widely accepted and would require no
reported by Kratzer and co-workers indicate
decomposition below the temperature range of
2000C) in air (ref. 64 pp.139-157).
expected to attain the highest
alarm and de-energize the machine
This surface temperature limit
retraining of personnel, and data
that many compounds do not begin
4330K to 4730K (1600C to
Verification and Certification
The potted explosion protection method req uires periodic verification
tests to guarantee the integrity of the electrical circuit and potting
compound. Potted enclosures must be certified to meet the performance
criteria which includes the mechanical, thermal, and batch integrity of the
potting compound. Adequate verification and certification test procedures for
the potted explosion protection method cannot be 'Fully defined at the present
state of deve'opment.
Verification
Verification tests must confirm the electrical circuit integrity,
mechanical stability, and chemical stability of the enclosure. Grounding
circuit integrity and the conductor isolators verification tests should be
performed as described for the explosion-proof enclosure. Tests to determine
if cracks, voids, and chemical breakdown have occurred in the potting material
must be routinely performed to verify that the enclosure can function
properly. The development of practical verification tests for potting
compound electrical, chemical, and mechanical integrity are essential before
this method of explosion protection can be successfully utilized.
Certification
A design review specification and certification test procedures must be
developed before a potted enclosure can be certified. Certification tests
must check for voids and cracks, determine batch sensitivity of the potting
compound, and determine the stable operating temperature of the machine. Each
enclosure should be certified at the time of manufacture to be free of voids
and cracks in the potting compound. Batch sensitive testing should be
accomplished to assure that each lot of potting compound is within
specification. The batch certification tests should include parameters such
as dielectric strength, tracking resistance, thermal conductivity, water
absorption, and flexural modulus, which are critical to the potted enclosure
method. The methods for testing each of these parameters for samples of the
potting compound are well established by the American Society for Testing and
Materials; however, testing the completed unit to certify a void and crack
free potting compound requires the same development requirements described for
verification tests. The potting compound temperature should be certified to
remain below 4230 (1500C). This could be accomplished by actual
measurement or by calculations involving the maximum power dissipation of the
machine and the heat capacity and conductivity of the potting compound. This
measurement or calculation should be completed for the machine in the normal
operating-mode.
HIGH VOLTAGE EXPLOSION PROTECTION METHOD COMPARISON
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Each of the three explosion protection methods presents vas^ying degrees
of difficulty in protecting the mine environment from ignition for
applications up to 15 000 volts AC. The effects of the supply voltage on
adequate conductor isolation, insulator selection, and power dissipation must
	
t
be considered when comparing explosion protection methods.
	
z
Conductor Isolation
High voltage conductor isolation must be reliably accomplished within
the selected enclosure due to the available energy and the potential for
damage to enclosure materials during breakdown. The theory of operation for
the potted enclosure assumes inherent conductor isolation. However, practical
application of this method requires definition of various verification and
certification tests (as discussed earlier), the potting compound
specification, and the protective enclosure specification. The
explosion-proof method provides conductor isolation by separi^tion and
insulation. It has been demonstrated that separation is not a reliable
isolation technique at high voltages for uninsulated conductors during methane
combustion. High voltage conductors should be insulated to provide reliable
isolation in an explosion-proof enclosure. The pressurized enclosure provides
conductor isolation by separation and insulation, also. However, the inherent
lack of methane combustion within the enclosure greatly increases the
reliability of the separation method of isolation.
Insul ator Selection
A high voltage insulator must reliably isolate the conductor under any
conditions anticipated for the enclosure. The selection of an insulation
material is most critical in the explosion-proof enclosure due to the harsh
conditions present during methane combustion. These insulators must not only
survive these combustion episodes, but they must also resist the effects of
corona discharge. The insulators selected for use in pressurized and potted
enclosures are not required to survive methane combustion due to the lack of
flammable gas concentrations within these enclosures. However, the insulators
must be resistant to the effects of corona discharge.
Power Dissipation
The power dissipation of a given machine will naturally increase as the
supplied power is increased. The potted enclosure is very sensitive to
variations in the power dissipation due to the natural thermal insulation of
the potting compound. Small changes in the power dissipated within this
enclosure can produce large temperature gradients in the potting compound.
The resultant temperature gradients are dependent on the heat capacity,
conductivity, and thickness of the potting compound: The pressurized and
explosion-proof enclosures provide air circulation around the machine by
forced circulation or convection; thus, these two methods are relatively
insensitive to changes in the machine power dissipation.
^f- r
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CONCLUSION
The performance criteria recommended in this guideline are sufficient to
provide adequate explosion protection with any of the three methods
evaluated. However, the implementation of these criteria, verification, and
certification requirements may be difficult in some cases. The lack of
definition, specifications, and basic research in the areas concerning potted
encloures currently make this particluar enclosure method a difficult choice
as a high voltage explosion protection device. The explosion-proof enclosure
explosion protection method can be applied to high voltage machines if due
consideration is given to the selection of the insulation materials. Certain
materials are not acceptable for use in this explosion protection method due
to their decomposition products and flammability characteristics. The
pressurized enclosure provides considerably more flexibility in the selection
of insulation materials, and can be directly applied to high voltage machines
using the present state of the art.
t'
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FOREWORD
r	 This report was prepared by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Johnson Space Center, White Sands Test Facility
under USBM Contract number J031801. The contract was initiated
under the Minerals, Health, and Safety Technology Program. It
was administered under the technical direction of the
I	 Pittsburgh Research Center with Lawrence W. Scott acting as the
f	 Technical Project Office. Joseph A. Gilchrist was the contract
administrator for the Bureau of Mines. This report concerns
the tests recently completed as a part of this contract during
#	 the period 15 August 1981 to 15 November 1982. This report was
i	 submitted by the authors on 31 January 1983.
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ABSTRACT
The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, is reviewing
explosion protection methods for use in gassy coal mines. This
test repo,;^t describes an investigation into the effects corona
discharg. ,
 and high voltage arcing have on the combustion of
various combinations of methane, coal dust and air mixtures.
Corona discharge and high voltage arcing were found to enhance
the reaction characteristics of methane, coal dust, and air
mixtures. However, the observed increase in reaction rates was
well within the rates expected by methane deflagrations.
Corona discharge was observed to ignite concentrations of
methane and air in some conditions.
	 Increasing the distance
between high voltage conductors and ground return paths in an
air atmosphere did not reduce the susceptibility for high
voltage arcing during methane deflagration. Varying the
ignition energy from less than 10 millijoules to over 1500
kilojoules caused no significant increase in the combustion
overpressure for the mixtures tested. These results have a
direct bearing on the recommendations for the performance
criteria of explosion protection devices as submitted on 15
December 1982.
v
INTRODUCTION
	
3
The United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines
(USBM) has requested the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, White Sands Test Facility (NASA WSTF) to
evaluate means of extending present explosion protection
methods to voltages up to 15,000 volts RMS AC. Explosion
protection methods currently under consideration include
explosion—proof, purged, and potted enclosures. The effects of
corona discharge associated with high voltage and high energy
arcing were examined in order to evaluate explosion protection
methods. While the deleterious effects of corona on insulators
and various materials are well known, the influence of
alternating current corona on methane and air combustion has
not been reported and a literature search has confirmed that
little data exists on the effects of high energy arcing on
methane and air combustion. This report describes an
investigation into some of the effects that corona discharge
and high energy arcing have on combustion of methane and air
mixtures and coal dust suspensions in methane and air mixtures.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
Corona discharge between electrodes is defined in numerous
ways. Some definitions are based on current and potential
characteristics, measurable current, visible appearance or
manifestations, and levels or thresholds of electrical
discharge up to and including complete breakdown.
	 In this
experiment, the term "corona" refers to a class of electrical
discharges as a result of accelerated ionization of gas under
the influence of the electrical field within a current range of
10- 6 to 10-2 amperes. This general definition bounds all
of the characteristics of corona discharge that are found
throughout the literature except "dark current" or "dark
discharge" corona which occurs at less current and complete
breakdown which occurs at greater currents than the range
specified. The term "high energy arc" or "arc" is defined as a
high curren (greater han 10- 2 amperes), self—sustaining
discharge.1, 2, 3, 41
Ignition of a flammable gas mixture is generally described as
combustion which is more specifically broken down into
deflagration and detonation type reactions.
1. The term deflagration is defined as a propagating
reaction in which energy transfer from the reacting zone to the
unreacted zone is by ordinary heat and mass transport process.
The resulting flame travels slower than the local speed of
sound and the resulting overpressure develops from the heating
due to chemical reaction.
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2.	 The term detonation is defined as a reaction in which
the energy is transferred from the reacting to the unreacted
zone on a reaction generated shock wave. This type of reaction
always propagates faster than the local speed of sound.
The objectives of this experiment were:
	 (a) Determine if
exposure to 60 Hertz alternating current corona ignites,
enhances ignition or enhances the reaction overpressure in
methane and air environments; (b) Determine if exposure to high
energy arcing enhances reaction rate or overpressure in methane
and air and coal dust suspensions in methane and air
environments.
EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS
The test system used to characterize the effects of high
voltage on methane combustion consisted of a test chamber (see
Figure A-1), a corona discharge source, high energy arc
equipment, an auxiliary ignition source, and data acquisition
and instrumentation.	 (See Figures A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-6.
The test chamber provided a con{.rolled volume where the methane
and air could be accurately mixed, exposed to the potential
ignition sources, and monitored f or combustion
characteristics. The test chamber was a one cubic meter
aluminum sphere with a one-quarter inch thick wall. 	 The
chamber was rated to a system working pressure of 250 psi. A
flange equipped with two high tension feedthroughs and a glass
window was mounted on the front of the chamber. A back flange
had penetration ports to provide for mixing methane and air,
purging with nitrogen and venting. Additionally, the back
flange was fitted with a 500 psi strain gauge transducer to
indicate test pressures on an oscillograph, a 1000 Torr
capacitive manometer to monitor mixing pressures, and a
feedthrough for instrumentation wiring. 	 (See Figure A•-1.)
The corona discharge source consisted of an 8,000 volt RMS AC
60 milliampere luminous tube transformer secondary connected to
the high tension feedthroughs by high tension (40,000 volt
maximum) cable. The pointed electrodes were constructed from
3/8 inch stainless steel rod and were mounted on the high
voltage feedthroughs protruding inside the test chamber. The
primary voltage was controlled by an autotransformer in order
to provide a variable secondary voltage.
	 (See Figure A-2.)
Sources of undesired corona discharge were washed with Freon
and coated with corona suppressant (Dielectric strength -
15,000 volts/.01 inch).
The high energy arc source was supplied by a 14,400 volts RMS
AC public utility line through a 100 ampere fused cutout, a 100
ampere recloser, and a remotely controlled oil switch. A 264
ohm series resistor was used to limit the arc current to 55
amperes RMS.	 (See Figure A-3.)
An auxiliary ignition source placed within the test chamber was
used in the corona discharge tests to ignite methane and air
mixtures that had not been ignited by the corona. This spark
ignition source consisted of a standard 12 volt oil—filled
automotive ignition coil encased in a plexiglass protective box
with two stainless steel electrodes connected to two
high—tension feedthroughs mounted on the box. The igniter was
activated externally by a switching circuit consisting of a
0.22 microfarad capacitor and a push button breaker switch
connected to a 14 volt DC power supply. (See Figure A-4.) The
spark igniter was secured to an instrumentation mounting frame
which was constructed from angle iron and placed within the
test chamber.	 (See Figure A-5). The igniter provided a spark
of 1 to 1.5 microsecond duration with an average energy of 8
millijoules in a 3/32 inch gap.
A capacitive circuit was assembled by connecting two parallel
plate capacitors in parallel.
	 One capacitor was fixed to the
instrumentation mounting frame inside of the test chamber.
(See Figure A-5.) The second capacitor was external to the
chamber. Connections were facilitated by the instrumentation
feedthrough. Each capacitor was fabricated from two square, 1
3/4 x 1 3/4 inch copper plates separated by 1/16 inch.
Together, the effective capacitance was 350 picofarads. A
digital multimeter was used to measure the voltage across the
plates.	 (See Figure A-6.) These two capacitors were used
during corona testing to detect the electric field due to the
igniter, indicate the strength of the field due to the corona
discharge, and indicate the field generated by the increase in
current as the flame front passed the corona discharge site.
In some of the corona discharge and high energy arc tests, open
aluminum cans were placed in various locations in the chamber
to observe if the differential pressure between the inside and
outside of the can was sufficient to crush them. This can be
regarded as evidence of a detonation.
An optical dust density monitor was constructed utilizing an
infrared emitter and detector to assure repeatable coal dust
suspension during one phase of arc testing. The dust density
output was recorded on a strip chart recorder. A funnel was
mounted in the test chamber and attached to the air inlet line
which provided a means of dispensing the coal dust and a fan
which was used to disperse the coal dust. 	 (See Figure A-5.)
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Four chromel-alumel type thermocouples were secured within the
chamber in order to measure combustion temperatures. 	 Three
temperature outputs were recorded by the oscillograph and the
fourth output was routed to the strip chart recorder.
Voltage applied to the electrodes was monitored by 1000X
voltage probes and recorded by the oscillograph and a memory
oscilloscope. Current measurements were made with a toroidal
current pick-up coil with the output amplified and displayed on
the oscilloscope and oscillograph. All tests were recorded on
video tape by a closed circuit TV camera located in front of
the glass window of the test chamber. (See Figure A-7.)
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The corona discharge testing and high energy arc testing were
conducted separately. The corona discharge source and high
energy arc source were entirely independent of each other.
Tests of coal dust combustion were conducted only with the high
energy arc source.
Tests were conducted at two fuel-air ratios. A mixture of 8.3
percent methane in air was used as the most easily ignitable
methane and air mixture. A 9.5 percent methane in air mixture
was used as the stoichiometric concentration which burned most
completely, thus leading to greater overpressures on ignitio
and the release of the maximum amount of free ions. (5. 6, 7^
A series of nine corona discharge tests were completed using a
test mixture of 8.3 percent methane in air at an initial test
pressure of 14.7 psia. 	 Seven additional tests with test
mixtures of 9.5 percent methane in air at the same initital
test pressure were also performed. Test mixtures of methane
and air were altered in some of the corona tests in the sense
that the air source was a combination of bottled certified
breathing air and atmospheric air with a higher relative
humidity, while the other tests used the dry bottled air only.
A total of eight high energy arc tests were performed. Four of
the tests were conducted in methane and air environments and
four were in test environments which had coal dust
suspensions. The methane and air tests had initial test
pressures of 14.7 psia, two at fuel-air ratios of 8.3 percent
methane in air and two at 9.5 percent methane in air. The coal
dust suspension tests were comprised of two tests of coal dust
suspensions in air and two coal dust suspensions in methane and
air.
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TEST PROCEDURE
The first phase of the corona discharge testing was performed
in order to baseline the experiment by comparing the corona
discharge characteristics exhibited in laboratory open air
experiments to those achieved in air in the test chamber. The
range of voltages applied to the electrodes was 5,000 volts
peak to 11,000 volts peak. Electrode gap spacing was either
3/4 inches or 6 3/4 inches depending on the test.
The first phase of the high energy arc testing consisted of
generating high energy arcs in air across electrode spacings of
6 3/4 inches to establish a system baseline.
The second phase of the corona discharge and high energy arc
testing was to perform a series of similar tests in order to
(a) Determine if exposure to 60 hertz alternating current
corona discharge ignites or enhances ignition or the reaction
overpressure; (b) Determine if exposure to high energy arcing
enhances reaction rate or overpressure in methane and air and
coal dust suspensions in methane and air environments.
The following procedure was used in the second phase of corona
discharge and high energy arc testing, except as noted.
(i) The test chamber was evacuated to approximately 0.5
torr.
(ii) Methane (minimum 99 percent pure) and air (certified
breathing air, except when otherwise noted on the test data
sheet) were admitted into the chamber by using the method of
partial pressures to obtain the required pressure and mixture.
(iii) The data acquisition and closed circuit television
system was activated.
(iv) For the corona discharge tests:
(a) The test chamber environment was exposed to
corona discharge for a specified time.
(b) The auxillary ignition source was activated to
ignite the methane and air mixture after exposing the test
chamber environment to corona discharge if no ignition had
occurred.
(c) Tests were repeated without generating a corona
discharge in the mixture utilizing the spark igniter as the
only ignition source.
t
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(v) For the high energy arc tests:	 A 14,400 volt RMS
alternating current was applied to copper electrodes with a gap
of 6 3/4 inches fusing a strand of 40 gave wire which
initiated an arc. The arc was allowed to continue for three
seconds and then the voltage was removed.
(vi) The test chamber was then purged with gaseous
nitrogen.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The results of the experiment are presented in two categories:.
the corona discharge testing phase of the experiment and the
high energy arc testing phase. Results of the corona discharge
experiments with 8.3 percent and 9.5 percent methane in air are
shown in Tables A-1 and A-2 respectively. Table A-3 is a
summary of data collected from the high energy arc tests.
Corona Test Results
A comparison between corona discharge experiments in the
laboratory and the corona discharge in air tests performed in
the test chamber revealed that the current and voltage
measurements from both configurations were within one standard
deviation when the testing circuit and measurement apparatus
were identical.
Results of the corona discharge experiments with 8.3 percent
and 9.5 percent methane in air are shown in Table A-1 and A-2
respectively. The pretest gas mixture temperature, the source
of air, the length of the corona discharge electrode gap, the
maximum corona current achieved, and the source of ignition are
listed for each test. The maximum change in pressure and
temperature is reported as AP and AT. The occurrence of sharp
pressure and temperature peaks during the more general
increasing trends is indicated for each test. The electric
field measured at the point where the corona current was
maximum and at the point of ignition is recorded as the voltage
across the parallel plate capacitor. Comments concerning the
deformation of open aluminum cans placed in the chamber give a
qualitative view of the overpressure phenomena during the
test. This data provides a basis for evaluating the combustion
process during each test. The ignition of 8.3 percent methane
in the humid atmospheric air mixture with the spark igniter was
achieved only after the test mixture had been exposed to corona
discharge across a 6 3/4 inch gap for 30 minutes (Test 3).
These conditions exhibited the greatest peak pressure and
fastest pressure rise of the tests performed in this phase of
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the experiment.	 In Tests 4 through 7, the spark igniter failed
to ignite the same mixtures which had not been exposed to
corona discharge. These tests indicate that the
preconditioning of the test mixture with corona discharge
enhances the likelihood of igniting the mixture.
Corona discharge generated through a 3/4 inch gap provided the
only source of ignition in Test 9. The corona discharge was in
the glow discharge regime (600 microamperes RMS) and evolved
into a full brush discharge that can be essential) classified
as self-sustaining (4.6 milliamperes). (1, 2, 3, 4^ The
corona current rapidly varied between values less than 1.0 and
greater than 4.6 milliamperes which was verified on the video
record which indicated occasional momentary extinction of the
discharge. The video record also indicated that as the methane
began to burn, the corona discharge intensified. As the corona
discharge intensified more combustion occurred leading to a
further increase of corona discharge current. This rise in
current was due to the flame front of the methane and air
mixture producing free ions that cause a large decrgase in
resistance of the gap between the electrodes. (5, 81
Two of the aluminum containers inside the test chamber during
Test 9 were distorted forming a hemispherical surface at the
end of one and the end partially expanded on the other. Two
other containers had minor distortions. Even though the
reaction rates in this and other tests were accelerated, no
indication of detonation or extreme container deformation was
observed.
The remaining tests at 8.3 percent methane in air (Tests 1, 2,
and 8, Table A-1) were performed using only the bottled air
source. Large distortions of corona discharge current were
observed in Test 1. The current was almost twice as large as
the corona discharge current observed through a gap of equal
size (6 3/4 inches) in test 3 and the corona discharge current
through a 3/4 inch gap which ignited the test mixture in Test
8.	 This larger current was probably ue to residual ions
attracted to the electrodes. (2, 3, 41 However, the larger
corona discharge current observed in Test 1 did not ignite the
test environment. The existence or creation of these ions may
have been related in the difference of the water content of the
air source. An unexpected ignition occurred during Test 8 even
though the limit of corona discharge current (10- 2 amperes)
was not reached. The power was turned off immediately upon
ignition.
	 The auxillary ignition source ignited the
environment in Test 2 with a single spark. These tests
illustrate the great uncertainty of corona discharge effects on
the ignition and combustion characteristics of methane.
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Resu' Its of seven corona discharge tests in 9.5 percent methane
in air mixtures are shown in Table A-2. Tests 6 and 7 were
conducted with only the auxillary ignition source in order to
establish a baseline of methane reaction characteristics in air
at this gas mixture. Tests 1 through 3 were exposed to corona
discharge for approximately 30 minutes and then ignited with
the auxillary ignition source.
	 Only slight variations in
reaction rates were observed in these three tests with the
exception that sharp peaks were recorded on the temperature and
pressure curve during Test 2 and 3. The video record of Test 3
indicated bright glowing spots in the area of the corona
discharge electrodes before the spark was initiated. This
record also indicated some local ignition occurred before the
auxillary ignition source ignitor was activated. The methane
air mixture was exposed to the corona discharge for four hours
before the spark ignitor was activated in Test 4. A
significant increase in temperature change and rate of
temperature and pressure change was observed after this longer
4 hour corona exposure when compared to the other tests in this
series. A corona discharge across a 3/4 inch gap unexpectedly
ignited the gas mixture in Test 5. The rate of reaction
indicators are noticeably increased for this methane and air
mixture with longer exposure to corona discharge.
High Energy Arc Testing
A summary of the data collected from the high energy arc
discharge tests is included as Table A-3. The test atmosphere
composition and pressure, power dissipated by the arc, arc
energy, peak pressure attained and pressure rise rate are noted
for each test.
The pressure profiles observed during the high energy arc and
corona discharge methane and air tests are very similar in
shape and magnitude. However, the incidental rapid pressure
and temperature peaks observed during the reactions initiated
by spark and corona discharge were not observed during the high
energy arc tests. Aluminum containers exposed to the high
eneray arc initiated reactions were only slightly deformed
during these tests. The high voltage arc was observed to be
very unstable and unpredictable in the presence of methane
combustion. The arc traversedaps ranging from 6 3/4 inches
(the gap between the electrodes }g
 to 23 inches (distance from
anode electrode to the angle iron instrumentation frame) during
the methane and air ignitions.
	 Thus tha integrity of the
electrode gap was not maintained during methane combustion.
Peak pressures and temperatures were lower in the tests which
included the addition of coal dust to the methane and air
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mixtures. The elapsed time from arc initiation to attainment
of peak pressure was decreased by a factor of 2.4 in the coal
dust tests, indicating a cooler, faster reaction.
CONE"USIONS
Corona discharge and high voltage arcing enhance the reaction
characteristics of methane, coal dust, and air mixtures,
however, the increase of reaction rates observed during these
tests was well within the rates expected by methane
deflagrations. Corona discharge can ignite concentrations of
methane and air under some conditions. The seperation of hign
voltage conductors will not Frevent high voltage arcing during
methane deflagrations.	 Variot ion in energy of the ignition
source caused no increase in overpressure during the combustion
of the mixtures tested.
Corona Discharge
(i) Corona discharge served as an ignition source in
methane and air environments. This was observed in two tests
at 8.3 percent methane in air and one at 9.5 percent. 	 In these
cases, the geometric domain and voltage at the corona discharge
site were manipulated to accelerate the corona discharge. The
video record for Test 3, Table A-2 shows that even at gap sizes
of 6 3/4 inch, corona discharge may ignite methane air mixtures.
(ii) Corona discharge enhanced conditions for ignition of
methane in air environments. 	 In one test using the 8.3 percent
methane in air mixture, ignition occurred with a single spark
generated by the spark igniter (Test 3, Table A-1) after the
test environment had been exposed to corona for 30 minutes. In
contrast, four tests using the same methane in air ratio that
were not exposed to corona failed to ignite when the spark
igniter was activated (Tests 4-7, Table A-1).
(iii) Corona discharge increased the possibilities of
overpressure conditions. Test environments exposed to corona
discharge showed higher rates of pressure rise. The greatest
pressure rise rate occurred in a test in which the mixture had
been exposed to corona for the longest time (4 hours). This
test also had the highest peak pressure (Test 4, Table A-2).
High Energy Arc Testing
(i)	 The separation of conductors by the air gaps
specified in these experiments did not prevent the high voltage
Ji
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system from arcing during the combustion of methane and air and
coal dust. Other measures are necessary to guard against
arcing at the voltages used (14,400 volts RMS AC) in these
environments.
(ii) The methane and air environments had no greater
tendency toward excessive overpressures when ignited by high
energy arcs than the same environments ignited by low energy
sparks in the presence of corona.
(iii) The addition of coal dust to the methane and air
mixtures resulted in reactions with slightly higher pressure
rise rates and lower temperature reactions compared to the arc
initiated reactions in methane and air environments without
coal dust.
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Figure A-7 DATA ACQUISITION EQUIPMENT
EXTERNAL TO TEST CHAMBER
o►
bL
c $
C a
€ = Z Z z z z Z d +1
$ s4. U	 CJI
E :5p^
N C B rl -4N 9
.4 1
-4 r-4 r-1 L QO
'V^- H >	 r-1	 2cZ
N
`^ L
N .1L ++ N7 rtl ^
N L b N A N
	 Q N
E 9 
CL	 2E
D- H
61
ro
d
^ po 0 0 0 0 o
om
m
00
N
CL
t11 ^D
N
4^
c^
''
s- b CL 00 r` M o 0 0 o Q n
CL
d N r^ 00 00
Z
co
axiro
ro-J c
b to b►
— N t41 L L
-W
b
-U
A Q Q
CO CO^•- '- p7
M
b
y C.6
N
Z Z Z Z O O
ro^ ^V1 U U
e
L N
O ^
U y
CL E 1
co L bE p Z O Z Z Z Z Z^ V
G1	 N
L	 a
qq^^ O O O O O O O O ON E O
CL 14
'^x	 N
w
v	 u
7 OJ Ol Q Q Q Q ¢ atL 
+-+ N 00 m. c c c c c m cL O a ro ro to ro ro roCo^Q `'^ Q co co co co co. an
C Ul
01-
.^
b
Q1 Ni N N g 00 r-1 m O ­4 -eM M N M N M of
a F^
+J
 N
N d 4 N m d' Ln lD n 00 M
H
z i
62	 }.
co^4 +c m = 4J 41
A C Z t tC a	 Q	 v) rn v^ c rn
U 0 Z Z VI V1 N hU
yO '
E	 4
V	 4A
'	
^
^
1
I"'^
•U.	 > r"4 f1 r-1 ZN
!U_
tV
L_ ^ to
S-
EL E > Y >- Z Y 	 ^-
0► d
N
N a. LM to k P., Ln sc toa
^c^
1
'	
ro Q •N
^°
4m rn 0000 Im ` OD 0000
CL
z
y roN
¢ 0)
w.1 F,
y
y
m b
L
u
6 tU
,F+
a
_
Y
+^
c Ad Y
y^
o c po^
L
a c
L
a
O
o
L
a
L
M
N N
a
U to
ro ►ml
to
L
N Ln
C
°
uO L
U y
CL
EeLn
O O O O Z z z^^ E
N	 toL	 ^C O O O O O O O
CL
X	 vl tiW
W	 u
,a t_0 0) to
53 + CCL}t (A co co m m m co m
00...
0
00 EOa
c aio L
++
toC1	 U. N VO'M M tt M
L N
.O .1 N M ef' in to 1^,
F- E7
iR
j
je
1(s
!z
:14 r^
	 ppL OL! ]L ` N O 0y1 Ln O pNpp OQ C	 Z M 01 r+ r♦ t0 to r'W	 r-1	 .-1
	 ri
L
a
Cl.
M N M M (7	 M M
La
ai
^. L
N 4! 01
	
01 d w	
Z Y Z0) MCL Z >- >. yL E
d ^
Q M 1^ r^ O 00 N	 pcptCel Z to Ln dam' N m
H
yC
'L a- Z M cn O
O 00 T	 01
N
O.
M
Qu
Lu L O1b
O00CC >w •r u
~ L r L C^ ^--1 U) d' O d In d'	 st0) C 0)• M M M M N N M NC CM 0
O) CL
r
C
O 0!
r LiJ 7 b t-^ f-^ r^ Il d' d' 00	 00
•C 
Ny .N
d' d' d' d' N N M MO1 L
.r rt ­4 r-) .-4 .-4 rl .^	 ri
W O.L
CL
C
0
to 4J0 to _
im 4J+ O O O O O O O OC CM
b Ol E N N
v ^
cg
L
•r 	 r.
CLam. C
b
C4J
x	 t.t
M M UY N O O 01
	
10
w
00 co rn a, o o cn	 rn
y v
L
CA in r-i N M ct 47 /D 1,	 co
Z
63
